Optimal Attack against Cyber-Physical Control Systems with Reactive Attack Mitigation

This paper studies the performance and resilience of a cyber-physical control system (CPCS) with attack detection and reactive attack mitigation. It addresses the problem of deriving an optimal sequence of false data injection attacks that maximizes the state estimation error of the system. The results provide basic understanding about the limit of the attack impact. The design of the optimal attack is based on a Markov decision process (MDP) formulation, which is solved efficiently using the value iteration method. Using the proposed framework, we quantify the effect of false positives and mis-detections on the system performance, which can help the joint design of the attack detection and mitigation. To demonstrate the use of the proposed framework in a real-world CPCS, we consider the voltage control system of power grids, and run extensive simulations using PowerWorld, a high-fidelity power system simulator, to validate our analysis. The results show that by carefully designing the attack sequence using our proposed approach, the attacker can cause a large deviation of the bus voltages from the desired setpoint. Further, the results verify the optimality of the derived attack sequence and show that, to cause maximum impact, the attacker must carefully craft his attack to strike a balance between the attack magnitude and stealthiness, due to the simultaneous presence of attack detection and mitigation

Modeling and Detecting False Data Injection Attacks against Railway Traction Power Systems

Modern urban railways extensively use computerized sensing and control technologies to achieve safe, reliable, and well-timed operations. However, the use of these technologies may provide a convenient leverage to cyber-attackers who have bypassed the air gaps and aim at causing safety incidents and service disruptions. In this paper, we study false data injection (FDI) attacks against railways' traction power systems (TPSes). Specifically, we analyze two types of FDI attacks on the train-borne voltage, current, and position sensor measurements - which we call efficiency attack and safety attack -- that (i) maximize the system's total power consumption and (ii) mislead trains' local voltages to exceed given safety-critical thresholds, respectively. To counteract, we develop a global attack detection (GAD) system that serializes a bad data detector and a novel secondary attack detector designed based on unique TPS characteristics. With intact position data of trains, our detection system can effectively detect the FDI attacks on trains' voltage and current measurements even if the attacker has full and accurate knowledge of the TPS, attack detection, and real-time system state. In particular, the GAD system features an adaptive mechanism that ensures low false positive and negative rates in detecting the attacks under noisy system measurements. Extensive simulations driven by realistic running profiles of trains verify that a TPS setup is vulnerable to the FDI attacks, but these attacks can be detected effectively by the proposed GAD while ensuring a low false positive rate.Comment: IEEE/IFIP DSN-2016 and ACM Trans. on Cyber-Physical System

Science and technology roadmap for graphene, related two-dimensional crystals, and hybrid systems

We present the science and technology roadmap for graphene, related two-dimensional crystals, and hybrid systems, targeting an evolution in technology, that might lead to impacts and benefits reaching into most areas of society. This roadmap was developed within the framework of the European Graphene Flagship and outlines the main targets and research areas as best understood at the start of this ambitious project. We provide an overview of the key aspects of graphene and related materials (GRMs), ranging from fundamental research challenges to a variety of applications in a large number of sectors, highlighting the steps necessary to take GRMs from a state of raw potential to a point where they might revolutionize multiple industries. We also define an extensive list of acronyms in an effort to standardize the nomenclature in this emerging field